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Introduction
The secondary market for U.S. Treasury securities is the largest and most active single financial market in the world. As of December 1994, private investors and institutions held $2,754 billion worth of U.S. Treasury securities.
1 Average daily trading is in the order of $100 billion per day.
Hence, understanding the functioning of this market is of crucial importance for academics, policy-makers, and practitioners.
It is a well-established paradigm in finance that asset prices are affected by the arrival of "news." Unanticipated changes in underlying variables can affect the cash-flows provided by an asset as well as the discount factors used to value the cash-flows. In the case of U.S. government debt, the variables likely to be relevant for pricing are those that characterize the general macroeconomic environment. In fact, unlike stocks and corporate bonds, there is little, if any, asset-specific information concerning Treasury securities.
Thus far, the lack of available data on the intra-day behavior of prices in the secondary market for U.S. government debt has made it difficult to study the impact of economic news on interest rates. Normally, several announcements and other news reach the market during any given day, making it hard to attribute price behavior to any one of them using daily return data.
We use intra-day price information, together with data on economic announcements and expectations, to differentiate between contemporaneous announcements and to determine which announcements significantly affect prices, the size and sign of the price response, as well as how quickly the new information is incorporated into Treasury prices. In addition to price data, our data set contains information on trading volume and bid-ask spreads, enabling us to also investigate the effects of different announcements on trading volume and bid-ask spreads.
There are at least three aspects of this study that are different and new relative to the existing literature that looks at intra-day price data. First, we utilize expectations data to calculate surprises in
The main findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, we that find eight economic surprises have a significant impact on the price of the three-month bill, the two-and ten-year note, and the thirty-year bond. Surprises also explain a substantial portion of price volatility around announcement times (up to 67%). Second, the Nonfarm Payroll component of the employment announcement is by far the most important announcement. Also, surprises in procyclical indicators (e.g. Nonfarm Payrolls) affect bond prices negatively, while surprises in counter-cyclical indicators (e.g.
Initial Jobless Claims) affect bond prices positively. Third, the adjustment of prices to news is extremely quick. In the case of the ten-year note (which is representative of the behavior of intermediate-and
long-term bonds), only five announcements (out of 16) induce a significant price reaction beyond one minute after the release. Fourth, for the ten-year note and the three-month bill, we also find a strong association between news releases and trading volume. Fifth, bid-ask spreads on the three-month bill and the ten-year note widen at the time of the announcement, but then revert to their usual magnitude immediately after. Finally, for almost all announcements that significantly affect prices, the volatility of the three-month bill and the ten-year note prices is significantly higher after the announcement.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data set. Section 3 studies the effects of announcements on prices. Section 4 studies the effects of announcements on trading activity: trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and price volatility. Section 5 concludes.
The Data
This section describes the data set used in the empirical analysis: the GovPX bond price data and the MMS forecast survey data. We also perform some tests to assess the properties of the MMS survey data.
Bond Prices
Our primary data set contains bid and ask quotes, trade prices, and trading volume for Treasury bills, notes, and bonds in the interdealer broker market. The data set covers the period from July 1, 1991 to September 29, 1995, and includes data over all 24 hours.
According to the Federal Reserve Bulletin (September 1993) , roughly 62% of the March-May 1993 Treasury security transactions in the secondary market occurred between dealers; that is, within the inner market. Treasury dealers trade with one another mainly through intermediaries, called interdealer brokers. Dealers use intermediaries, rather than trading directly with each other, in order to maintain anonymity. Six of the seven main interdealer brokers 3 provide price information to the firm GovPX (the exception is Cantor Fitzgerald). In turn, GovPX provides price information directly to
Treasury bond dealers and to other traders through financial news providers, such as Bloomberg.
Daily trading volume in the most recently issued securities, "on-the-run" or "active" issues, is measured in the billions of dollars, and the number of transactions in the active issues recorded by
GovPX is in the order of three to seven hundred a day. Bid-ask spreads are also very narrow for all securities averaging 5.3 cents for 100 dollars of price.
Dealers leave firm quotes with the brokers, along with the largest size that they are willing to trade.
The best quotes across all the participating primary dealers as well as the size of the order the quotes are good for are posted on the GovPX screen. Thus, the posted quotes are also the prices at which actual trading takes place. At a minimum, these quotes are good for one million dollars, and normal units are in millions of dollars.
Survey and Announcement Data
The data on economic announcements and expectations are from Money Market Services (MMS), a San Francisco-based corporation which has conducted telephone surveys since late 1977. The MMS data are the most commonly used data in studies of economic announcements. Edison (1996) , Hakkio and Pearce (1985) , Ito and Roley (1987) , Hardouvelis (1988) , McQueen and Roley (1993) , and Urich and Wachtel (1984) are some of the many previous studies that have used the MMS data to calculate the surprise component in economic announcements.
MMS conducts a survey of about forty money market managers on the Friday of the week before the release of each variable under consideration. MMS reports the median forecast from the survey.
The announcement of a given economic variable typically occurs on the same day of the week. For example, the employment figure is always released on a Friday; the PPI figure is usually released on Thursday or Friday; and the Index of Leading Indicators figure is mainly announced on Wednesdays or
Fridays. Thus, the distance in days between the time of the MMS survey and the announcement of the corresponding economic variable does not vary much; the standard deviation of this distance ranges from a minimum of 0.85 days for Consumer Confidence to a maximum of 1.69 days for Construction
Spending. Moreover, these news releases tend to be concentrated in the last two days of the week. So, the distance between survey and announcement also tends to be the same across announcements. For 21 of the 26 announcements, the average number of days between survey and release is between five and six.
The 26 economic news announcements that we consider are shown in Table 1 . 4 This is a more comprehensive set of economic announcements than in any existing study. As shown in 
Properties of the MMS Survey Data
We had two main concerns regarding the MMS data. First, although these data have been widely used,
we would like to provide some direct evidence of their accuracy. Second, new information may reach 4 For most monthly announcements, we have 51 observations. We lose one observation in the case of the Index of Leading Indicators, and Personal Consumption and Personal Income, because of the timing of the releases. We also lose two observations (219 rather than 221) for a weekly announcement, Initial Jobless Claims, since the Labor Department started releasing this figure beginning July 18, 1991.
5 The dates of the announcements reported by MMS were checked against the dates recorded by Salomon Brothers. The few discrepancies were then verified against the information from Business Week, in "The Week Ahead" section, which confirmed the information from Salomon Brothers. The times of the announcements are those recorded by Salomon Brothers.
the market between the time of the survey and the release, and this information may affect expectations. Table 2 reports the results of a regression of the actual announcement, A i , on the median forecast of the MMS survey, F i , and the change in the ten-year note yield from the time of the survey to the time of the announcement, ∆y:
(1) Several announcement series are announced in levels and are very persistent. In order to make the regressions meaningful, A i and F i are measured in percentage changes of the announced value, except for those announcements already reported in differences. These are Nonfarm Payroll (reported as the difference in thousands), and Treasury Budget and the money supply announcements (reported as the difference in billions of dollars). For these announcements, the numbers used in the regressions are differences (not percentage change).
The regression model in Equation (1) allows us to test several hypotheses. First, if there is information content in the MMS survey data, we would expect the coefficient estimates α 1i to be positive and significant. Second, if the survey information is unbiased, we would expect the α 0i coefficient estimates to be zero, and the slope terms α 1i to be one. Finally, if expectations are revised between the survey and the announcement, there should be a price change at the time of the revision, and we should see a relationship between the change in yield and the announcement. Now consider the regression results reported in Table 3 . The adjusted R-squared is higher than 50% in the majority of the regressions. In all but two cases, the α 1i coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero.
8 Moreover, the intercept terms are not significantly different from zero in 21 out of 6 We used the ten-year yield, rather than a shorter maturity rate, because we found that short-term rates do not respond as significantly to economic announcements. 7 Since the change in yield during the week preceding the announcement might be only a noisy indicator of the revision of expectations, we also considered as explanatory variables the surprise components of all other announcements released between the date of the survey and the announcement. These surprises are defined as in Equation (3). The results are essentially unchanged. In particular, the slope coefficients on the announcement forecasts are almost identical, with only four coefficients differing in magnitude by more than 0.1. Since the results of this second set of tests are so similar, we decided not to report them in the paper. 8 Here, and in the remaining of the paper, a coefficient is denoted significant if its t-statistic differs from zero in a two-tailed test at the 5% level. Since in all regressions there are at least 30 observations, the corresponding 26 regressions. Also, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the survey enters with a coefficient of unity in 17 out of 26 regressions. This is strong evidence that the survey data that we use contains real information about the variable being forecasted, and in most cases this is an unbiased forecast.
Moreover, in 20 of 26 cases, the estimate of the coefficient on the yield change is insignificant. And even when the yield change is significant, in four of the six cases we later show that the announcement significantly affects all note and bond prices (e.g. Nonfarm Payroll). Thus, we may also conclude that the revision of expectations between survey and release is not a major issue.
These results complement the findings of Pearce and Roley (1985) who test the properties of the MMS survey data for money supply, industrial production, unemployment, PPI, and CPI. They find a significant bias only in the industrial production forecasts. They also note that the survey data is more accurate than autoregressive models by virtue of lower mean squared errors.
9
Regardless of the results above, it is possible that the surprise components in the announcements is measured with error. Since the surprises are then used as regressors in our tests, these errors-invariables induce a bias towards zero in the coefficients, as well as inflate the standard errors of the estimates. Hence, t-statistics are biased towards zero. This affects the interpretation of our results in the following sense: the actual significance level of the tests may be higher than what we report.
Economic News and Bond Prices
This section explains the methodology used to evaluate the impact of the different announcements on bond prices. We then study which announcements have a significant effect on bond prices, and the speed at which new information is incorporated into prices. We also discuss the size of the effect of the various announcements. critical values can be read off the table for the normal distribution, and they equal ± 1.96. Moreover, all regression t-statistics use White's standard error estimates to correct for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 9 McQueen and Roley (1993) perform similar tests for a different sample period, and they also conclude that the survey data generally have smaller mean squared errors than autoregressive models.
Methodology
Let F i denote the median of the MMS forecast survey and A i the released value for announcement i.
We measure the surprise in the announcement i as:
Since units of measurement differ across economic variables, we divide the surprises by their standard deviation across all observations to facilitate interpretation. Our "standardized" surprise measure is:
Thus, when regressing bond returns on surprises, the regression coefficient is the change in return for a one standard-deviation change in the surprise. Since the standard deviation σ i is constant across all the observations for a given announcement i , this adjustment does not affect either the significance of the estimates or the fit of the regressions. The only reason for the standardization is that it allows us to compare the size of regression coefficients associated with surprises in different announcements.
To analyze the effect of economic news on bond prices, we regress price changes on the surprise in the economic variable being studied and the surprises in variables announced simultaneously.
10,11
where 10 One instance were including all simultaneously announced surprises is problematic is the case of Imports, Exports, and Merchandise Trade Balance. The three announcements are released at the same time, and Merchandise Trade Balance is simply the difference between Exports and Imports. Hence, in the regressions for Imports and Exports we exclude the Trade Balance. In the Trade Balance regression, we exclude Imports and Exports. This accounts for the small differences in R 2 reported in Table 3 . 11 One potential concern is that the impact of economic announcements may change over time. Although we would not expect substantial variation during the 1991-1995 time period we consider, which witnessed a gradual economic expansion, we explore this possibility using the approach of Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) and allow for differential impacts for each year in our sample. We conduct tests using data for the ten-year note and examine the fifteen announcements that significantly affect its price. Taking 1991 as the reference year, we tested whether the responses in the remaining four years were significantly different, for a total of 60 tests. Only in 22 cases do we reject the null of equality of the response at the 5% level, and the pattern of the rejections is quite erratic. We regard this as very weak evidence of time variation during our sample. In addition, we only have few observations for each year, which it makes the estimation of these differential effects problematic. Hence, in what follows we assume the announcement responses are constant over time.
1. P 30it is the price thirty minutes after announcement i at time t. Prices are measured as the average between the bid and ask quotes.
2. P -5it is the price 5 minutes before the announcement at time t.
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3. β 1i is the sensitivity of the price to the announcement.
4. k denotes the k-th announcement concurrent with announcement i, and K is the total number of concurrent announcements.
t i k
S is the standardized surprise in the k-th announcement concurrent with announcement i at time t.
β k i
+1, is the sensitivity of the price to the k-th announcement concurrent with announcement i.
As an example of the methodology, consider the employment announcement. From To explore this issue further, we regressed price changes on announcement surprises and included the price change of a bond of different maturity as an additional independent variable. When we regress note and bond returns on the 3-month bill return, the surprises that are significant maintain their significance. For example, when we regress the 30-year bond return on announcement surprises and the 3-month bill return, 7 of 10 announcements are still significant. When we run the same regression for the 10-year note, 12 of 16 announcements maintain their significance. And for the 2-year note only one announcement loses significance. When we regress the note and bond returns on other note or bond returns, most significant announcements loose there significance. The number of announcements that remain significant ranges from one (when we regress the 30 year on the 2 year) to four (when we regress the 10 year on the 2 year). Thus, the return on any intermediate or long maturity instrument seems to serve as a factor for the returns on other intermediate and long maturity instruments, but the 3-month bill return does not. These results support the statement that at least two factors are needed to model the yield curve.
Second, the R-squared for the significant announcements can be quite high. For instance, in the case of the two-year note, the R-squared for the employment announcement (Civilian Unemployment and Nonfarm Payrolls) is 67.7%. This indicates that a substantial portion of price volatility around announcement time is explained by the surprises.
Third, it is important to note how we have been able to separate the effects of variables announced concurrently by using our surprise data, and how it is the availability of the MMS forecast data that allows us to calculate surprises. 14 Consider, for example, Nonfarm Payrolls and the Civilian Unemployment rate. These announcements are always released together at 8:30 a.m. Thus, without knowing the surprise components of the two announcements, there is no way to separate their influence. However, examining Table 4 shows that the surprises in the Civilian Unemployment rate affect prices much less than surprises in Nonfarm Payrolls. What we have shown is that it is the Nonfarm Payroll figure that affects bond prices, while the Civilian Unemployment rate is much less important. Also, consider the National Association of Purchasing Managers (NAPM) Index and Construction Spending. Previous studies (e.g. Ederington and Lee, 1993, and Fleming and Remolona, 1996) have not attempted to distinguish between the effects of the two 10:00 a.m. announcements, and therefore find them equally important. Once again, examining Table 1 shows that 43 out of 50 times they are announced at the same time. Using our surprise data, we are able to show that it is the NAPM Index and not Construction Spending that affects prices. In fact, not only are the sensitivities for Construction Spending insignificant across instruments of different maturity, but they vary in sign.
Again, this shows the importance of using surprise data in comparing announcement effects.
Fourth, we find that for most announcements the size of the effect increases with the maturity of the instrument. For the Nonfarm Payroll announcement, for example, the surprise coefficient (in absolute value) increases from 0.013 for the three-month bill, to 0.0160 for the two-year note, to 0.416 for the ten-year note, to 0.592 for the thirty-year bond. 15 This is consistent with the notion that longer maturity bond prices are more volatile (duration increases with maturity ).
Some Further Discussion
Of the eleven announcements that significantly affect the prices of at least three maturities, two It is also interesting to provide an interpretation for the lack of significance of some of the economic announcements. For example, the reason for the lack of impact of the Index of Leading
Indicators may have to do with the fact the Index is a weighted average of 11 components. 17 While the market may find some of the components relevant for pricing, this information might be confused by the other components of the index. The lack of significance of U.S. Imports may be attributed to the fact that these announcements have implications both for aggregate economic activity and for foreign exchange rates, and thus convey a mixed signal. In addition, the Treasury Budget announcements are also not significant, probably because they are related to one component only of total aggregate demand. The reason why the market reacts to M2, but not to M1 and to M3, is that both M1 and M3
15 All of these coefficients are negative. 16 Of these announcements, Retail Sales, Capacity Utilization, and Industrial Production have a significant impact on the prices of both the two-and ten-year note. 17 The eleven components of the index are: the average workweek, weekly jobless claims, new orders for consumer goods, vendor performance, contracts and orders for new plant and equipment, building permits, changes in unfilled durable goods orders, sensitive material prices, stock prices, real money supply (M2), and consumer expectations.
are viewed as not having a stable relationship with nominal GNP.
18 Indeed, this result is consistent with the findings of Hallman, Porter, and Small (1991) , who document a long-run link between M2 and the price level for the 1955-1988 period.
For the ten announcements that significantly effect the prices of all notes and bond prices, we calculated the average yield changes induced by the announcements for the different maturities. For all announcements, the absolute yield change for one standard deviation of surprise is largest for the twoyear note, and smallest for the thirty-year bond. This is consistent with the notion of the short rate being stationary around a long-run mean: in equilibrium, the longer the maturity of the rate, the smaller the variability (see, for example, Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross, 1985) . The (absolute) size of the yield changes reflects the price effects documented above. One standard deviation of Nonfarm Payroll
Surprise induces the largest change in the ten-year yield, 5.6 basis points, while one standard deviation of M2 Medians induces the smallest change, 0.3 basis points.
It is also interesting to examine how some of our results would differ if daily, rather than intra-day, price data had been used. For this purpose, we also estimated a regression model analogous to that in Equation (2), but where the intra-day price change is replaced by the daily one as the dependent variable. 19 Of the ten announcements that we find significant for all note and bond prices, three would not be significant if we used daily data: Initial Jobless Claims, Housing Starts, and M2 Medians. This is not surprising, since the standard error of the slope estimates increases with the variability of the residual in the regression. As the time window around the announcement widens, the variability of the residual term also increases, because a smaller portion of price variability can be explained by any given announcement. Hence, as we move from intra-day to daily data, the statistical significance of some announcements gets lost.
Perhaps more importantly, when the time window is widened announcements that are not significant may erroneously show up as significant. Consider the situation where two announcements 18 Interestingly, the correlations between surprises in the three monetary aggregates are not very high. In fact, the highest correlation coefficient is between surprises in M2 and M3, 0.7. Hence, the lack of significance of surprises in M1 and M3 cannot be attributed to a problem of multicollinearity. 19 The daily price change is defined as the change between 6:00 p.m. the day before the announcement and 6:00 p.m. on the announcement day.
are often released on the same day, but at different times during the day, and assume that the market reacts significantly only to the first of the two announcements, although the two surprises are correlated. Using daily data, the second announcement may seem to be significant, when in fact it is not. The only way to avoid this "spurious significance" is to include in the daily regressions all announcements that took place on the days when the primary announcement of interest was released. This is much more cumbersome than controlling only for the concurrent announcements, as in the present study. And in fact, the existing studies of announcement effects which use daily data control only for a few, if any, of the announcements that take place on the same day.
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The importance of looking at intra-day data is also supported by the evidence in Section 3.5 below.
There, we show that most announcements that significantly affect the price of the ten-year note, do so within one minute of the release, and all but one have no impact after 25 minutes from the release.
Sign and Size of Response
Commentaries in the financial press explain the reaction of the bond market to economic news mainly in terms of revisions of inflationary expectations, where, in accord with a Phillips-curve view, inflation is perceived to be positively correlated with economic activity. Our results are consistent with this interpretation. Procyclical variables, such as Nonfarm Payrolls, affect bond prices negatively, while counter-cyclical variables, such as Initial Jobless Claims, have a positive impact on prices. 21 Regarding the size of the price reaction, the following discussion concentrates on the behavior of the price of the ten-year note, which is representative of the behavior of intermediate-and long-term bond prices. The 16 economic announcements that significantly affect the ten-year note have differing impacts in terms of the magnitude of price changes. Per unit of standard deviation of surprise, the most important is Nonfarm Payrolls. To gain some idea of the importance of this announcement, note that the standard deviation of the daily percentage price change for the ten-year note is 0.47%. Thus, a one standard deviation surprise in nonfarm payrolls, corresponding to an increase in nonfarm payrolls of 20 Hardouvelis (1988) , for example, controls for only 15 of all the announcements that may be released during a given day.
21 King and Watson (1994, 1996) document the existence of an inflation-output and an inflationunemployment trade-off in U.S. post-war data.
110,000, leads to a price change of about 89% of the normal daily volatility of price changes. 22 
Speed of Impact
One interesting issue to investigate, in addition to the size of the response, is how quickly bond prices react to economic news announcements. As in the previous section, we concentrate on the behavior of the price of the ten-year note. Table 4 presents the results of the following regression
where P it τ is the price τ minutes after the announcement. The regression is performed for the 16 significant announcements identified in Table 3 . The endpoint of the horizon used to calculate rates of return is kept constant, while the beginning of the horizon, τ, is changed from -2, two minutes before the release, to +25, 25 minutes after the announcement. This allows us to identify the lowest value of τ for which the price reaction is not significant. This corresponds to the time period needed for the surprise to be fully incorporated into prices. 22 The second column of Table 3 reports the standard deviation of the surprises for each variable. This, together with the economic units reported in Table 1 , facilitates an economic interpretation of the results. 23 In order to examine whether the announcement effects are different across maturities, we calculate the covariance matrix of the estimates of the slope coefficients for the four regressions (one for each maturity considered). We then construct Wald tests to examine whether the responses are statistically different across maturities for the eight announcements that have a significant impact on all bond prices. For each announcement, we perform individual pair-wise tests that the coefficients are equal, as well as a joint test that all coefficients are equal. Out of a total of 56 tests (48 pair-wise tests and 8 joint tests) only in six cases do we fail to reject that the coefficients are different at the 5% level. Hence, we conclude that the null hypothesis that the effect is the same across maturities is strongly rejected.
Of the 16 announcements, only five significantly affect prices on or after τ = 1: Merchandise Trade Balances, U.S. Exports, Capacity Utilization, Factory Orders, and NAPM Index. None are significant beyond 15 = τ . Thus, even for these six announcements information is rapidly incorporated into prices.
Moreover, the pattern of significance for Merchandise Trade Balances, U.S. Exports, and Factory
Orders is erratic, which casts some doubt on the relevance of these delayed price effects.
The high speed of adjustment is also documented by the graphs reported in Figure 1 , which shows the average percentage price change of the ten-year note in response to the first four significant announcements released at 8:30 a.m. The figure also shows that the reaction of prices to positive and negative surprises is roughly symmetric.
Economic News and Bond Trading
This section studies the effects of economic announcements on trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and price volatility. In this analysis, we focus on the three-month bill and the ten-year note whose price behavior is representative of short-term and intermediate-to-long-term instruments, respectively. We also concentrate on the announcements that significantly affect the price of the two instruments.
24,25 Table 5 presents the ratio of the average trading volume over different intervals preceding and following announcement times to the average volume over the same interval on days when no announcement took place. Ratios are reported for the ten-year note and the three-month bill. 24 In a related paper, Fleming and Remolona (1999) examine intra-day trading activity in the vicinity of scheduled announcements. Since they only consider one year of data, they pool observations across the three announcements they examine. In addition, they only consider one instrument, the five-year note. The general pattern of their results is similar to ours. However, as our findings indicate, there is substantial variation in the results across announcements and maturities that is missed by their analysis. 25 We do not report the results for announcements that do not have a significant impact on prices. The impact of these announcements depends on the amount of overlap with other announcements and the importance of the concurrent announcements. For example, consider the Treasury Budget and Business Inventory announcements, which do not have a significant price effect and have no concurrent announcement (see Table 1 ). The bid-ask spread and price volatility of the ten-year note are unaffected by these two announcements, while trading volume is slightly higher than normal for Business Inventories. In contrast, the Index of leading Indicators, which also has an insignificant price effect, is concurrent with a number of important announcements and shows patterns in trading volume, bid-ask spread, and volatility, similar to the concurrent announcements.
Trading Volume
We also ran regressions of volume against the absolute size of economic surprises, in the same way as we did with bond returns. We found little evidence of a statistically reliable relation between trading volume and the size of the surprises, even for the announcements that significantly affect bond prices. This is not surprising, since volume should reflect disagreement among investors concerning the price adjustment. 26 This disagreement need not be directly related to the size of the surprise. In fact, while a large surprise may induce investors to revise their priors in the same manner, and hence triggers little trade, a small surprise may generate wide disagreement, and hence triggers a large surge in trading activity.
For the ten-year note, we find consistent patterns of volume for each of the announcements which have a significant impact on prices, with the exception of Consumer Confidence. In the five minutes before the announcement, volume is either not different from or significantly less than trading volume on non-announcement days. Within the first five minutes after the announcement, trading volume grows to about 1.7 times the average volume for that time period on non-announcement days. The volume ratio continues to grow in the following ten minutes, up to almost twice the size of the nonannouncement average, but then declines after another 15 minutes, while still remaining above normal. 27 For the three-month bill, we also find that volume is substantially higher around announcements, although the pattern is somewhat erratic.
It is also interesting to compare the different effects of announcements on trading volume and on prices. First, the effects of announcements on trading volume differ much less than the effects on prices. Consider, for example, the ten-year note. From Table 3 we see that a one standard deviation surprise in Nonfarm Payroll triggers a price change which is more than 20 times larger than the effect of a one standard deviation surprise in M2 Medians. However, the largest increment in trading volume during the interval of 5 to 15 minutes after the announcement (the PPI announcement) is less than twice as big as the smallest increment (the money announcement).
Second, the announcements that affect prices most are not those that have the greatest effect on volume. Consider again the ten-year note and trading volume during the interval of 5 to 15 minutes after the announcement. The Nonfarm Payroll-Civilian Unemployment announcement has only the fourth largest effect on volume. From Table 3 we know that the Nonfarm Payroll surprise has, by far, the largest effect on prices. We also found that several of the announcements that exhibit significant increases in volume at some point after their release time are also announcements for which the surprise does not appear to affect prices (these results are not reported in the table) . 28 Third, the effects of announcements on volume persist even beyond 30 minutes after the release, yet we know from Table 4 that for most of the announcements that significantly affect the price of the ten-year note, the impact is exhausted within the first minute after the release.
The discussion above highlights the fact that trading volume behaves somewhat independently of price changes. As in French and Roll (1986) , we can distinguish between public information which affects prices with little or no trading, and private information which only affects prices through trading. Hence, the evidence that we collected suggests that public information plays a dominant role in the adjustment of bond prices after economic announcements. Table 6 presents the ratio between the average bid-ask spread at different times before and after the announcement and the average bid-ask spread at the same times during non-announcement days for the ten-year note and for the three-month bill. 29 The average spreads are 2.6 cents and 0.26 cents per one hundred dollars price, for the bill and the note, respectively.
Bid-Ask Spreads
For most announcements, for both the ten-year note and the three-month bill, we find a significant widening of the spread exactly at the time when the announcement is made. The spread then reverts to its normal values after five to fifteen minutes. 28 In a sense, this is not very surprising when we consider the number of times non-significant announcements overlap with announcements that do move prices. Even the observed trading volume after the 9:15 a.m. announcements may be affected by important announcements released 45 minutes earlier. 29 Once again, we find no relation between the size of the bid-ask spread and the surprise component of the announcement.
There are several theories that predict this response. First there is an asymmetric information argument that predicts a widening of the spread because of the fear on the part of market makers that traders may be better informed (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, and Glosten, 1987) . Since there should be no leakage of information before announcements are made, and since information relevant to the bond market is quickly disseminated in a widespread manner, asymmetry arises not because different information is received by traders, but because traders may have differing ability to process the information. A second argument that suggests bid-ask spreads will widen around announcements relies on the interpretation of bid-ask spreads as an "option to trade" offered by the market maker to traders (Copeland and Galai, 1983, and Ho and Stoll, 1981) . The price of the option to trade is the bid-ask spread itself. As volatility increases because of the announcement, the value of the option increases, and this is reflected by a widening of the spread.
As with trading volume, it is interesting to compare the effects of announcements on bid-ask spreads to those on prices and volume. First, the Nonfarm Payrolls announcement induces both the largest price adjustment and the largest widening of the bid-ask spread. This is true for both the tenyear note and the three-month T-bill. Second, in the case of the ten-year note, the quick reversion of bid-ask spreads to normal values mirrors the quick adjustment of prices to news. This is not surprising, since the need on the part of market makers to protect themselves from informed traders should be exhausted as soon as prices have adjusted to their new "equilibrium" values.
Price Volatility
We also examine price volatility around announcements. We measure this by the ratio of the mean absolute value of price changes on announcement days over the mean absolute value of price changes on non-announcement days, during the same time interval. 30 The time intervals that we consider start with 30 to 5 minutes before the announcements and end with 45 to 60 minutes after the announcements.
30 By standardizing the announcement-day volatility by non-announcement-day volatility at the same time of the day, we adjust for possible systematic intraday volatility patterns. The presence of such patterns in the bond futures market is examined in Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (1999) .
For both the ten-year note and the three-month bill, the relative size of the volatility effects reflects the relative size of the price effects documented in Section 3. For example, for the tenyear note, during the time interval 0 to 5 minutes after the announcement, the largest increases in price volatility are for the employment announcement and for the PPI announcement, with ratios of 10.2 and 6, respectively. For the three-month bill, the largest increase in price volatility also corresponds to the employment announcement, with a ratio of 19.2 for the same time interval.
It is worth noting that for many of the announcements the volatility effects persist for up to 60 minutes after the release of the announcement. For example, for the ten-year note volatility is still more than twice the normal during the time interval 30 to 45 minutes after the employment announcement. This persistence is similar to the persistence in trading volume discussed earlier and is in contrast to the rapid adjustment of prices to new information.
We may conclude that price volatility reflects both the adjustment of prices to news as well as the mere impact of trading volume. In fact, there are several announcements that do not significantly affect prices (and hence are not reported in Table 7 ) that lead to significant increases in price volatility.
Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of economic announcements on the price, volume, bid-ask spread and price volatility of Treasury securities. To analyze price effects, we use intra-day data of bid and ask quotes from the inner market for U.S. government bonds. Our database provides a continuous posting of bids and asks, and the trading around announcement times is sufficiently intense that in most cases there are multiple trades every minute. This allows us to measure impact on price at very short intervals. Many announcements are made concurrently. By using a database on forecasts, we are able to measure the surprise component of an announcement. This allows us to separate out the impact of concurrent announcements. While previous researchers have grouped simultaneous announcements together, we find that in several cases of important announcement pairs only one of the two announcements has a significant impact on prices. Because of our ability to separate out the impact of concurrent
announcements, and because we analyze intra-day price data, the announcements that we find important differ from what other researchers have found. We find that most economic announcements are incorporated in bond prices within one minute of the announcement for most significant announcements. This implies that the inner market for U.S. government bonds is highly efficient.
We also consider the effects of announcements on transaction volume, bid-ask spreads, and price volatility. We find that the patterns of trading volume are quite different from those in prices, thus suggesting that private information and differences in opinion only play a minor role in the market for U.S. Treasuries. Bid-ask spreads tend to widen significantly immediately after the announcement, and then to quickly revert to their normal values, which is consistent with the quick reaction of prices to news. The behavior of price volatility is also consistent with the price reactions that we document.
Appendix: Bond Price Data
The GovPX data set is relatively new. Thus, in this appendix we will provide some additional details about it and make some comparisons to better known data sets. Additional details can be found in Green (1998) and Fleming (1997) .
GovPX distributes its information through on-line vendors, by sending out a digital ticker feed. We were given digital backup copies of the feed. The data provides a precise history of the tick-by-tick information sent to traders. Since the purpose of the digital feed is to refresh vendors' screens, the data must be processed before it can be effectively analyzed. GovPX's digital ticker feed contains a time stamp which is the actual time, rounded to the closest second, when the message reaches the computer terminals. It is the arrival of the information to the screen that determines the time stamping. The messages reach screens every 60 seconds (give or take one second). Hence, we have 60 24 1440 × = messages each day, although some of the messages are simply "refreshers" and do not change any of the existing information on the screen for some bonds.
It is important to note that the GovPX data reports continuously the best price quotes collected by the major brokers among all the primary dealers, where the quotes are binding. All other sources currently available only report end-of-day prices and collect data from a smaller pool of dealers. For example, the CRSP data consists of the quotes from one dealer only, Salomon Brothers, until 1962.
After 1962, CRSP began using data collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which, in turn, over the time frame of this study, are an average of the price quotes from five primary dealers.
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The Wall Street Journal, on the other hand, reports the quotes posted by one of the brokers only, Cantor Fitzgerald, which are collected through a Dow Jones subsidiary, Telerate. Hence, the price data collected by GovPX provide a better representation of the market for U.S. Treasury securities than the data provided by these other sources.
It is worth noting that the only other existing source of intra-day bond data is the futures market.
However, much of the analysis performed in this paper would not be possible with futures data. In particular, intra-day information on bid-ask spreads and trading volume is not available for the futures 31 Recently the Federal Reserve Bank of New York began using GovPX data as their primary source, so that the CRSP data is also currently based on the GovPX data set. markets. For example, the data provided by the Chicago Board of Trade is tick-by-tick data: transaction prices which are recorded separately only if there was a change in price. Bid-ask quotes, successive trades at the same price, and trade volume are not recorded. Also, futures contracts have delivery options that make it hard to determine exactly the maturity of the instrument to be traded at a forward date. This is especially true for the bond futures contract, that has bonds with maturities ranging from 15 to 30 years as the deliverable instrument. Finally, the GovPX data provides aroundthe-clock price and trade volume information. This makes it possible to study the effects of announcements that take place when domestic and foreign futures markets are closed. This is the case of the money supply announcements which are released on Thursdays at 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time. 32 In fact, trading in London (LIFFE) stops at 11:10 a.m., while trading in New York (AMEX) and Chicago (CBOT, CBOE) stops at 3:00 p.m., and evening trading in Chicago (CBOT) only resumes after 6:00 p.m. (7:00 p.m. when daylight saving time is in effect).
32 Throughout the paper times are to be interpreted as Eastern Standard Time. King, R. G., and Watson, M. (1996) 
where A it is released value of the announcement, S it is the median expectation across a number of market participants survey approximately one week before the announcement, and ∆y it is the change in the closing yield of the ten-year note between the date of the survey and the day before the announcement. All announced values are the change in percentage terms, except for Nonfarm Payrolls which is the change in thousands, and Treasury Budget and the money announcements which are the change in billions of dollars. The table reports R 2 , the coefficients and t-statistics using White's standard errors. The t-statistic for α 1i = 1 is also reported. The sample period covers 
where P 30it is the price of the instrument 30 minutes after the announcement i, S it is the surprise for announcement type i standardized by σ i 2 , the standard deviation of all surprises for that type. The subscript k denotes other announcements released at the same time as announcement i. The table reports σ i 2 , the coefficient β 1i , and the t-statistic using White's standard errors. R 2 for the regression is also reported. 
where P 30it is the price of the ten-year note 30 minutes after announcement i, P τti is the price of the ten year note τ minutes after the announcement, S it is the standardized surprise for announcement type i, and k denotes other announcements occurring at the same time as announcement i. A number of different time horizons τ are chosen to measure price changes, with the endpoint of each price change being fixed at 30 minutes after the announcement. The table reports the coefficient γ 1i for each time horizon for all announcements found to be significant for the ten-year note. Under each coefficient is the t-statistic using White's standard errors. The sample coves July 1, 1991 through September 29, 1995.
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